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I.  INTRODUCTION 
That law and religion come into conflict is seemingly inevitable.  Both 
systems create their own integrated normative systems, translating shared 
values and ethics into rules and obligations.  Such lofty goals generally serve 
society well.  Individuals derive meaning, identity, and community from 
both law and religion.  Indeed, the two often reinforce each other’s efforts as 
both law and religion are frequently invoked in crusades against oppression, 
evil, and tyranny, with notable examples in United States history including 
Abraham Lincoln’s “Second Inaugural”1 and Martin Luther King’s “I Have 
 *  Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Director, 
Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics. 
 **  Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Associate Director, 
Diane and Guilford Glazer Institute for Jewish Studies.  We would like to thank Lauren Hartley, 
Nicole Rodger and the rest of the Pepperdine Law Review staff, whose hard work ensured the 
success of this symposium volume. 
 1.  Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) 
(transcript available at http://memory.loc.gov/service/rbc/lprbscsm/scsm0304/001r.jpg). 
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a Dream” speech.2 
But the relationship between law and religion is not always 
reinforcingto the contrary, the two often find themselves at loggerheads.  
In truth, the relationship between law and religion is so deeply fraught 
precisely because both aspire to the similar lofty goals of imposing rules and 
obligations, each demanding the ultimate allegiance of those who come 
within their respective jurisdictions.  And it is these aspirations for 
supremacy that make us, at times, justifiably uneasy and nervous about the 
competing ambitions of both law and religion. 
We thus stand in an ambivalent relationship to both law and religion.  
Religion can provide us with a higher purpose and sense of meaning.  But it 
also has the ability to motivate mass violence and intolerance.3  It is 
therefore not surprising that religion’s introduction into public discourse 
often serves as a source of concern and resentment.4  At the same time, law, 
which can promote lofty ideals such as equality and dignity, also can, to 
quote Robert Cover, “signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon 
others.”5  Indeed, the abuse of legal authority has caused some of the most 
horrifying atrocities in recent human history. 
Given the potential for both law and religion to promote the most noble 
of human goods and the most depraved of human evils, the endless jousting 
between the twoeach continuously seeking to tame the otherwill 
undoubtedly remain a permanent feature of the human experience.  Indeed, it 
seems every new day brings yet another debate over the proper respective 
roles for law and religion to play in a twenty-first century liberal democracy.  
Shortly before the conference, which serves as the basis for this symposium, 
there were clashes over requiring religious employer-provided health 
insurance to include coverage for contraception,6 the proposed ban of 
 2.  Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963) (transcript available at 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm). 
 3.  See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Religious Extremism: A Fundamental Danger, 50 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 743, 743 (2009) (noting that particularly religiously motivated terrorism constitutes “one of the 
gravest threats against democratic societies in the 21st century” because, among other reasons, 
“[r]eligion is a powerful motivator for both positive social change and mass violence [and i]t is a 
force in society that is difficult for many in a secular society to truly understand”). 
 4.  This debate frequently revolves around John Rawls’s claim that religious argumentation 
should not provide the ultimate grounding for political claims in the public sphere.  See John Rawls, 
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 783–84 (1997).  For a selection of 
responses, see JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 65–77 (2004); ROBERT F. COCHRAN, 
JR., FAITH & LAW: HOW RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW AMERICAN 
LAW 3–7 (2008); Robert Audi, Religious Values, Political Action, and Civic Discourse, 75 IND. L.J. 
273 (2000); Abner S. Greene, Constitutional Reductionism, Rawls, and the Religion Clauses, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2089 (2004); Andrew R. Murphy, Rawls and a Shrinking Liberty of Conscience, 
60 REV. POL. 247 (1998); Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 817 (1993). 
 5.  Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 
 6.  See Erik Eckholm, Poll Finds Wide Support for Birth Control Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/us/politics/americans-divided-on-birth-control-
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circumcision in San Francisco,7 the rise of anti-sharia legislation aimed at 
prohibiting courts from relying upon religious law,8 the scope of 
constitutional protection for religious institutions from anti-discrimination 
statutes,9 and the viability of a presidential candidacy given the candidate’s 
professed religious affiliation.10 
One response to these clashes has been further entrenchment, with 
advocates from across the political and religious spectrums working to raise 
the metaphorical wall of separation to new heights. 
For some secularists, this entrenchment means ensuring that the public 
sphere remains free of religious symbols, courts remain free of reference to 
religious law, and legislative debate remains free of religious argumentation.  
From such a vantage point, the increased visibility of religious individuals, 
institutions, and groups in the public sphere has sparked concerns over the 
coverage-poll-finds.html?_r=1; Sarah Kliff, Lawmakers Debate Mandated Coverage of 
Contraceptives in Health-Care Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/lawmakers-debate-mandated-coverage-of-contraceptives-in-health-care-law/2012/02/16/ 
gIQAgf3jIR_story.html; Lisa Wirthman, Health vs. Faith: The Debate over Insurance for 
Contraceptives, DENVER POST, Mar. 4, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_20083126. 
 7.  See Adam Cohen, San Francisco’s Circumcision Ban: An Attack on Religious Freedom?, 
TIME, June 13, 2011, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2077240,00.html; 
Jennifer Medina, Efforts to Ban Circumcision Gain Traction in California, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/us/05circumcision.html; Valerie Richardson, San 
Francisco Ban on Circumcision a Cut Too Deep for the Faithful, WASH. TIMES, June 13, 2011, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/13/for-faithful-san-fran-ban-on-circumcision-a-
cut-to/?page=all. 
 8.  Bill Raftery, An Examination of 2011 Sharia Law & International Law Bans Before State 
Legislatures, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 27, 2011), http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/01/27/an-
examination-of-2011-sharia-law-international-law-bans-before-state-legislatures/ (collecting state 
legislative initiatives aimed at banning sharia and international law); see also Michael A. Helfand, 
Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1233 n.4 (2011) (collecting bills). 
 9.  The most notable example has been the recent debate over the ministerial exception, which 
the Supreme Court addressed in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 
S. Ct. 694 (2012).  For some commentary, see Thomas C. Berg, Kimberlee Wood Colby, Carl H. 
Esbeck & Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial 
Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175 (2011); Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
96 (2011); Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 156 
(2011); see also Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 
(2011). 
 10.  See Michael Brendan Dougherty, Did Romney’s Mormonism Doom Him in South Carolina?, 
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 21, 2012), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-01-21/politics/ 
30650015_1_mitt-romney-anti-mormonism-newt-gingrich; Jason Horowitz, Romney’s Religion Still 
a Sticking Point, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/romneys-
religion-still-a-sticking-point/2012/01/02/gIQA71y6WP_story.html; Kenneth T. Walsh, Mitt 
Romney’s Mormon Issue, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 6, 2012, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/Ken-Walshs-Washington/2012/02/06/mitt-romneys-mormon-
issue. 
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compatibility of religious ideology and the fundamental commitments of the 
liberal nation-state.  Thus, critics of mixing religion into the public sphere 
aim to push religion out so as to promote a political culture grounded in 
universal theories of individualism.11 
But secularists are not the only ones calling for further fortification of 
the wall of separation.  Indeed, many religionists have similarly generated a 
call for further entrenchment, advocating that their communities withdraw 
from American political life and focus inwards on their own shared 
communal obligations and values.12  This agenda has been accompanied by a 
growing trend towards a “new multiculturalism,” with groups marshaling 
their collective power not to secure inclusion within the public sphere, but 
instead to demand autonomy and self-government outside the public 
sphere.13 
Despite these attempts to disentangle political and religious life, it is 
difficult to imagine their complete rupture within American society.  If 
recent legal debates provide any indication, it is that the complex 
interactions between religious and political norms will remain a permanent 
feature of the American condition even as some advocates on both sides of 
the political spectrum seek to wall off the political from the religious—and 
vice versa.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized some time ago: “No 
perfect or absolute separation is really possible . . . .”14  Notwithstanding 
attempts to the contrary, religion remains an active participant in the 
American cultural landscape.  Indeed, many of our legal controversies arise 
precisely because religion and politics still continue to engage in a healthy, 
robust, and heated conversation. 
Thus, litigation over the constitutional protections afforded the Christian 
Legal Society occurs because the Christian Legal Society functions within 
the confines of a public law school administered by the state of California.15  
Legislatures have sought to limit the ability of courts to reference religious 
law because religious groups continue to enforce religious rulings within the 
 11.  For a discussion of the political philosophy underlying the focus on universalism and the 
politics of equal dignity, see Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: 
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25–44 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
  Such a perspective is captured in the French principle of laïcité.  For recent analysis of 
laïcité, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Religious Exemptions, Formal Neutrality, and Laïcité, 13 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 473 (2006); see also T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A 
Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419 (2004); Meira Levinson, 
Liberalism Versus Democracy? Schooling Private Citizens in the Public Square, 27 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 333 (1997). 
 12.  See Helfand, supra note 8, at 1268–82. 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970). 
 15.  See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
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confines of the United States legal system.16  And debates over the mandated 
health insurance coverage provided by religiously affiliated hospitals and 
universities occur because such institutions remain fully entrenched within 
civil society.17 
This reality of continuous interaction between religion, law, and politics 
served as the baseline assumption of the Third Annual Religious Legal 
Theory Conference, titled The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who 
Should Influence Whom? on February 23–25, 2012, sponsored by 
Pepperdine University’s Nootbaar Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics and 
Pepperdine’s Diane and Guilford Glazer Institute for Jewish Studies.  At its 
core, the conference theme presumed that law and religion—and in turn, 
religion and politics—forever engage each other in conversation, each 
providing its own perspectives on how to resolve everyday social 
problems.18  So often, the situs of this conversation is the individual whose 
self-understanding flows from the ongoing dialogue between the religious 
and political components of one’s identity.19  In this way, individuals 
remain—to use Michael Sandel’s term—“encumbered” by their contextual 
existence20 and the dialogic character of their religious and political 
commitments.21  These competing and complimentary strands of individual 
identity evolve because there is no realistic way to wall off religion from law 
or religion from politics. 
Of course, once we take for granted that law, religion, and politics are 
not hermetically sealed off from one another, the questions turn to how we 
should incorporate and balance these disparate streams of wisdom.  The 
 16.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 178–91 (2003) (criticizing strict 
separationism and advocating a theory of “two-way protection” where “there is a reciprocal 
relationship between ethical identity and democratic politics”); see also AYELET SHACHAR, 
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 117 (2001) 
(advocating a theory of transformative accommodation that promotes the circulation of power 
between both religious authority and state authority). 
 19.  See, e.g., 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187, 187–210 (1985); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 
31–41 (1991). 
 20.  See Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. 
THEORY 81, 90–91 (1984). 
 21.  For further discussion of the dialogic and discursive character of individual identity, see 
SEYLA BENHABIB, In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current 
Controversies in Practical Philosophy, in SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND 
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 23, 23–67 (1992); SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF 
CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA 1–22 (2002); see also JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN 
POLITICAL THEORY 239, 239–52 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998). 
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Competing Claims of Law and Religion conference panels and speakers 
considered almost every angle of these questions, addressing debates about 
family law, medical care, legislative prayer, anti-discrimination law, student 
life on campus, and commercial law.  Speakers examined these questions 
from the perspectives of a wide variety of religious traditions, from 
numerous constitutional viewpoints, and from several academic disciplines, 
including sociology, philosophy, political science, and theology, as well as 
law. 
The following contributions to this symposium have been selected from 
the wide range of presentations at The Competing Claims of Law and 
Religion conference.22  They capture some of the most pressing issues and 
debated concepts in the field of law and religion. 
II.  THE TOPICS 
A.  The State of the Culture Wars and a Proposed Ceasefire 
We begin this symposium edition with the Nootbaar Institute’s Louis D. 
Brandeis Lecture, “Law, Religion, and the Common Good,” which was 
delivered at the conference by sociologist James Davison Hunter.  In his 
conference lecture, Hunter lays out the current state of the conflict between 
law and religion in the United States.23  It is not a pretty picture.  Both sides 
of the culture wars seek to gain political power and to achieve their 
objectives through law; law serves as a weapon in the hands of each.24  Each 
is fighting for control of the law, attempting to regulate more and more.25  
There is no common morality to which the competing sides may look; the 
sides have incommensurable values.26  Freedom suffers, because law is the 
means of defining the good.27 
To address this clash, Hunter calls for a ceasefire.28  He suggests that 
both sides pull back from the use of law and give other cultural institutions 
room to grow so as to give “greater independence and authority for those 
civic institutions that do generate and enable values—faith, the arts, 
education, family, and philanthropy.”29  In the terms of the religion clauses 
of the Constitution, Hunter calls for greater freedom for religion and for less 
 22.  A complete schedule from the conference is available at https://law.pepperdine.edu/ 
nootbaar/news-events/events/law-and-religion/Nootbaar-Law-and-Religion-Brochure.pdf. 
 23.  James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion, and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1065 
(2013). 
 24.  Id. at 1079. 
 25.  Id. at 1079–80. 
 26.  Id. at 1076–77. 
 27.  Id. at 1075. 
 28.  Id. at 1082. 
 29.  Id. 
01 COCHRANHELFAND WHITE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/13  2:32 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1051, 2013] Symposium Introduction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1057 
religious establishment.30 
Responding to Hunter, Zachary Calo addresses the challenge of a 
postsecular world, a world in which, quoting Hunter, we are faced with “the 
empirically undeniable persistence of religion in the late modern world, the 
recognition of the limits of secular epistemology and reason,”31 “an 
intensifying and unstable pluralism,”32 and “no possibility of deep moral 
consensus.”33  Calo challenges Christians to maintain a difficult 
balanceadvancing a theological jurisprudence which presents Christianity 
as “the true story of law” while resisting “the violence of advancing a 
univocal account of law in a culture devoid of any common cultural basis.”34  
He argues that Christians should pursue “a modesty about what can and 
ought be reasonably accomplished within a pluralistic order.”35 
Patrick Brennan has little use for modesty.  He holds up the recently 
enacted, explicitly Christian, Hungarian constitution as a model and 
arguesbased on theologically-grounded, Thomistic, natural lawfor the 
role of law and authority in establishing values.36  Brennan criticizes what 
Hunter identifies as a “minimalist view of ‘natural law.’”37  Brennan quotes 
Benjamin Rush, a signatory to the Declaration of Independence: “Nothing 
but the Gospel of Jesus Christ will effect the mighty work of making nations 
happy.”38  Brennan argues that we have it on divine authority that “all 
authority comes from God”39 and that “it is for the authority of the Church to 
tell the state what moral principles should inspire its social activity and its 
legislation.” 
B.  Neutrality 
In his conference presentation, Andrew Koppelman proposes neutrality 
as an alternative to radical secularists’ call for “complete eradication of 
religion from public life” and religious traditionalists’ call for “frank state 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id. at 1067. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Zachary R. Calo, Faithful Presence and Theological Jurisprudence: A Response to James 
Davison Hunter, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2013). 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 1088. 
 36.  Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Mighty Work of Making Nations Happy: A Response to 
James Davison Hunter, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1091, 1092–95 (2013). 
 37.  Id. at 1102 (quoting JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD 332 n.9 (2010)).   
 38.  Id. at 1105 (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
366 (1991)). 
 39.  Romans 13:1. 
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endorsement of religious propositions.”40  According to Koppelman, “First 
Amendment doctrine treats religion as a good thing,” but insists “that 
religion’s goodness be understood at a high enough level of abstraction that 
the state takes no position on any live religious dispute.”41  The state can 
affirm “religion in general,” but not any religion in particular.42  Under 
Koppelman’s “neutrality,” the public square is not stripped of religious 
argument.43  Citizens are free to assert religious arguments for political 
positions, but opponents may challenge such claims.44  He acknowledges 
that this “may be acrimonious, but at least we’ll be talking about what really 
divides us. . . .  It’s more respectful to just tell each other what we think and 
talk about it.”45  Koppelman argues that: “Citizens may make whatever 
religious arguments they like in favor of a law, so long as the law that is 
ultimately passed is justifiable in nonreligious terms.  Because government 
may not take a position on religious truth, a law that can only be justified in 
religious terms is invalid.”46 
Chad Flanders launches a two-fold attack on Koppelman’s claim that 
allowing endorsement of religion defined at a very high level of abstraction 
is neutrality.47  Flanders agrees “with the radical secularist, that 
Koppelman’s abstract ‘religion in general’ is too much like religion to be 
neutral, but [agrees] with the religious traditionalist, that religion in general 
may not capture perfectly what many (or most) of us mean by religion.”48  
Flanders explores why we prefer religion: “Religion gives us a special kind 
of hope, a hope that transcends the mundane.  This is a type of good that 
can’t be captured by secular theories: it suggests that no matter the 
appearances, the world as such is just, or at least tends towards justice.”49 
Richard Garnett also challenges Koppelman’s claim that his description 
of First Amendment jurisprudence is neutral toward religion.  Indeed, 
Garnett argues that “the coherence and attractiveness of the regime 
Koppelman proposes and defends depends substantially on its not beingat 
least, not entirely‘neutral.’”50  Whereas Koppelman and Flanders consider 
religion-law tensions from a state-centric viewwhat is the state going to do 
 40.  Andrew Koppelman, And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American Law, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 1115, 1115 (2013). 
 41.  Id. at 1116. 
 42.  Id. at 1136. 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id. at 1133. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at 1136. 
 47.   Chad Flanders, Can We Please Stop Talking About Neutrality?  Koppelman Between Scalia 
and Rawls, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2013). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.   Id. at 1146 (citing CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007)).   
 50.  Richard Garnett, Neutrality and the Good of Religious Freedom: An Appreciative Response 
to Professor Koppelman, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2013). 
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about religion?Garnett considers them from the perspective of the 
church.51  He explores the Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on 
Religious Liberty, which envisions a “healthy secularity”—one that 
“respects the distinction between religious and political authority.”52  
Moreover, Garnett calls on government to support the “structure of religious 
freedom” and to encourage “a web of independent, thriving, distinctive, self-
governing (in their appropriate spheres) institutions.”53 
C.  The Priority of God or Law? 
In his symposium contribution, Michael Paulsen argues that both free 
exercise and non-establishment were grounded by the founders and should 
today be grounded on “the priority of God.”54  According to Paulsen, 
“Freedom of religion, understood as a human legal right, is government’s 
recognition of the priority and superiority of God’s true commands over 
anything the State requires or forbids.”55  Paulsen argues for protection of 
any religious exemption claimant who “has any plausible claim to religious 
truth.”56  Such claims law should be rejected only if the claimant seeks to 
violate the “clear, universal moral command of God.”57  Paulsen also 
grounds non-establishment in religious truth: “[b]ecause God’s commands, 
rightly perceived, trump the State’s commands, it makes no sense to say that 
the State can determine what God’s commands are and whether an 
individual or group has rightly perceived them.”58  Accordingly, “[W]e do 
not trust the State to tell us the proper way to know, worship, and serve 
God.”59 
Eugene Volokh objects to Paulsen’s proposals and calls for “the priority 
of law.”60  Volokh contends that Paulsen’s proposals “would require the 
government to judge quintessentially theological questions.”61  It appears 
that they would restrict the judiciary to religious believers.  “How can 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id. at 1157.  
 53.  Id. at 1158.  
 54.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1159 (2013). 
 55.  Id. at 1160. 
 56.  Id. at 1162. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 1160. 
 59.  Id. at 1161. 
 60.  Eugene Volokh, The Priority of Law: A Response to Michael Stokes Paulsen, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1223 (2013). 
 61.  Id. at 1223. 
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someone who doesn’t believe in God figure out what the ‘clear, universal 
moral command of God’ would be, if there were a God?”62  In addition, 
Volokh questions the great privileges that Paulsen’s proposals would give 
religious believers vis-à-vis non-believers.  “Why should my belief in what 
God commands me to do allow me to take something away from you, when 
you don’t share this belief?”63  Volokh argues that legislatures are making 
good practical judgments regarding when to provide religious freedom 
protections and that we should continue to rely on them. 
D.  Separation of Religion and State 
In his symposium contribution, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim argues that 
law and religion should be “[c]omplementary, [n]ot [c]ompeting.”64  He calls 
for the “separation of Sharica and Law.”65  According to An-Nacim, “[t]here 
is a realm of legitimate interaction between legal and religious norms” but 
“Sharica, by its nature and purpose, can only be freely observed by believers, 
and its principles lose their religious authority and value when enforced by 
the state.”66  He says: 
[Law should be based on] the human judgment of those who control 
[legal] institutions [and] should not be misrepresented as 
“religious.”  This is what I refer to as the separation of Islam and the 
state.  On the other hand, the religious beliefs of Muslims, whether 
as officials of the state or private citizens, tend to influence their 
actions and political behavior.  I refer to this reality as the 
connectedness of Islam and politics.67 
In turn, “Islam and the state must be institutionally separate in order to 
safeguard the possibility of being Muslim out of personal conviction rather 
than conformity to the coercive will of the state.”68 
Mohammad Fadel criticizes An-Nacim’s proposal as “separationist.”69  
According to Fadel, An-Nacim ignores the risk of “non-religious citizens 
capturing the state and using it to further their own, sectarian, or even at 
 62.  Id. at 1224. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Abdullahi A. An-Nacim, Complementary, Not Competing, Claims of Law and Religion: An 
Islamic Perspective, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1231 (2013). 
 65.  Id. at 1239. 
 66.  Id. at 1234. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 1237. 
 69.  Mohammed Fadel, Seeking an Islamic Reflective Equilibrium: A Response to Abdullahi A. 
An-Nacim’s Complementary, Not Competing, Claims of Law and Religion: An Islamic Perspective, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2013). 
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times anti-religious, ends.”70  Thus, “in lieu of a separationist paradigm, the 
law should adopt a paradigm of principled reconciliation in which legal 
values and religious values are in a state of continual dialogue, with the 
potential that each may inform and shape the other.”71  Fadel supports John 
Rawls’ framework, where law is based on “principles of justice that 
adherents of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, whether religious or non-
religious, can endorse for morally compelling reasons internal to their own 
conceptions of the good.”72  As a result, “A reasonable religious citizen will 
therefore not propose the use of coercive power to enforce religious norms 
that cannot reasonably be justified within the limitations of public reason.”73 
E.  Application of the Religion Clauses: Endorsement and Regulation of 
Religion 
Whereas most of the articles in this symposium edition address broad 
questions of law and religion theory, many speakers at the conference 
addressed narrower questions of law’s relationship to religion.  Included in 
this symposium edition are three articles addressing specific questions about 
how law relates to religious enterprises. 
Analyzing one facet of contemporary Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, Mark Strasser discusses the non-endorsement test, a test 
proposed by Justice O’Connor and, at times, applied by the Supreme Court.74  
In the words of Justice O’Connor, this test would preclude the government 
from sending a “message to [religious] nonadherents that they are outsiders, 
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message 
to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”75  Following a review of the cases, Strasser concludes that, 
the test is likely to remain one of the tests used by the Court to 
determine whether Establishment Clause guarantees have been 
violated . . . but will in reality pay mere lip service to religious 
minorities’ sincere reactions to a variety of practices privileging 
some religions over others and privileging religion over non-
 70.  Id. at 1261. 
 71.  Id. at 1260. 
 72.  Id. at 1267. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Mark Strasser, The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well: A Cause for Celebration and 
Sorrow, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1273 (2013). 
 75.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 




Addressing the role of law and religious institutions of higher education, 
Susan Stabile criticizes the current standard under which the National Labor 
Relations Board determines whether it has jurisdiction over religious 
colleges and universities.77  Under current rules, in order to receive an 
exemption, such institutions must establish that they have a “substantial 
religious character.”78  Stabile argues that this test “is an unnecessarily 
intrusive one that substitutes the government’s views about what it means to 
be religious for the views of the institution and the religious community with 
which is it affiliated.”79  She advocates the current D.C. Circuit rule, which 
requires that in order to get an exemption, a college or university need only 
establish that it “(a) holds itself out to the public as a religious institution; (b) 
is non-profit; and (c) is religiously affiliated.”80 
Approaching a somewhat similar question of legal regulation of 
religious institutions, Barak Richman argues that rabbi certification 
organizations should be subject to Sherman Act anti-trust regulation.81  He 
argues that these organizations, 
severely limit the supply of rabbis available to hiring congregations 
and prevent both rabbis and congregations from enjoying the 
benefits of an open labor market.  They also meaningfully interfere 
with a congregation’s ability to deliberate fully over whom to 
interview, pursue, and select to be its religious leader of choice.  In 
short, these tight restraints on employment convert the rabbinic 
organizations into professional cartels that simultaneously restrain 
the operation of a potentially competitive labor market and prevent 
congregations from freely expressing their religious practices and 
beliefs.82 
F.  Law, Religion, and Influence 
A final pair of papers address questions of religion’s influence on law 
 76.  Strasser, supra note 74, at 1274. 
 77.  Susan J. Stabile, Blame it on Catholic Bishop: The Question of NLRB Jurisdiction Over 
Religious Colleges and Universities, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1317 (2013). 
 78.  See Carroll Coll., Inc. v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“In a series of 
decisions following Catholic Bishop, the NLRB created a framework for analysis that looked to 
whether a school has ‘substantial religious character’ to determine if it is exempt from 
jurisdiction.”). 
 79.  Stabile, supra note 77, at 1319. 
 80.  Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 81.  Barak D. Richman, Saving the First Amendment from Itself: Relief from the Sherman Act 
Against the Rabbinic Cartels, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1347 (2013). 
 82.  Id. at 1348. 
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from broadly philosophical perspectives: one proposing a specific form of 
religious influence on law and lawyers, the other suggesting that religion has 
greater influence on law in Western liberal countries than liberalism is 
willing to acknowledge. 
Sherman Clark argues that law can learn from religion and that lawyers 
can learn from preachers.83  Drawing from Socrates, Clark notes ways in 
which both law and religion can and do influence character: “While the 
construction of character is a more obvious aspect of religious than legal 
thought, law, including legal argument, can be constitutive in similar 
ways.”84  “[L]egal speech can learn from religious speech how to be less 
small, and perhaps more ennobling.”85  It can do so by direct exhortation 
(challenging people to be people of character), by direct attribution 
(addressing people as if they were people of character), and by modeling 
character.86 
John Hill explores the thought of John Stuart Mill and concludes that 
many of the legal concepts that are dear to liberals’ hearts are grounded in a 
religious worldview.87  “The contradictions [between theism and naturalism] 
within Mill’s thought are the contradiction of liberalism itself.”88  Hill 
highlights “ways in which modern liberal political thought depends upon 
ideas integral to the God-centered conception of the world,” including its 
views of human rights, freedom, and responsibility.89  For example, “Taking 
rights seriously means taking seriously the idea of a transcendent moral 
order that measures the positive law of particular nations.”90 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Competing Claims of Law and Religion generated a lot of 
discussion among participants with competing claims.  Such discussions can 
lead to mutual understanding and common ground; a deeper understanding 
of one another’s positions may lead us to identify unseen possibilities; 
reflection may yield transformation.  Nevertheless, as George Marsden has 
noted, “Ultimately we do not solve all of the problems of pluralism by better 
 83.  Sherman J. Clark, To Teach and Persuade, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1371 (2013). 
 84.  Id. at 1371. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 1377–88. 
 87.  John Lawrence Hill, Theism, Naturalism, and Liberalism: John Stuart Mill and the “Final 
Inexplicability” of the Self, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1401 (2013). 
 88.  Id. at 1405. 
 89.  Id. at 1402. 
 90.  Id. at 1402–03. 
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communication and more ‘dialogue.’  The more we understand each other 
the more likely we are to also discover some fundamental differences.”91  
We suspect that the discussions at the Competing Claims conference 
generated some of all of these results. 
When we look at some of our present disagreements, we may see little 
hope of resolution.  But when we look at our broader history we can see 
areas where common understandings have emerged.  Some surprising 
coalitions have been formed: freedom of religion in the United States 
emerged, in part, through the collaborative efforts of Baptists and 
Enlightenment liberals.  Some people with strong convictions have been 
persuaded by others: states adopted non-establishment provisions through 
the political processes; Calvinists and Roman Catholics have emerged 
among the strongest supporters of religious freedom.  Our history also 
shows, however, that these conversations are not easy.  It took decades, even 
centuries, of conversation and struggle within and among religious and non-
religious traditions to resolve such questions.  We are hopeful that the 
discussions at the Competing Claims conference and the articles in this 
symposium will play a helpful role in this ongoing dialogue and will 
contribute to the enduring dialectic of law and religion. 
 
 91.  GEORGE MARSDEN, THE OUTRAGEOUS IDEA OF CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP 57–58 (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998). 
